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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the problem space of forbidden games: 
games not only on the border of games and reality, but 
explicitly referencing the double-coded nature of that 
boundary—in other words, games that use their status as 
“only a game” as a strategic gesture. It asks three key 
questions: what does it mean to be a forbidden or “brink” 
game, what is the function of these works, and, perhaps 
most importantly, to what extent do they have critical 
potential. To answer these questions, a methodological 
approach is drawn from functional systems theory, as read 
primarily through the work of Niklas Luhmann. Through 
this approach, I demonstrate the importance of these games 
in relation to the separation of games and reality, and 
suggest the strength of such works lies in their ability to 
both observe and critique everyday life. 
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THE PROBLEM SPACE OF FORBIDDEN GAMES 
What makes up the boundary of a game and what occurs at 
that border? The question comes from Katie Salen and Eric 
Zimmerman, who suggest that answering these questions 
brings us closer to understanding "the paradoxical 
artificiality of games and the way that games relate to the 
real-world contexts that they inhabit"  [21]. This paper takes 
up this question with regard to certain games that call the 
fringe of the magic circle their native home: “forbidden” 
games1. What is so forbidden about forbidden games (or 
forbidden play within games)? Is the idea of transgressing 
the game/reality border so contentious, so…forbidden? 
Perhaps a new term is needed— I would like to suggest 
brink 2  better captures the play of  instability and 
                                                          
1 The origin of the term “forbidden games” is somewhat 
murky: Salen and Zimmerman make reference to forbidden 
play [21], while Gonzalo Frasca [8] specifically uses the 
term forbidden games, with a nod to the 1952 film of the 
same name. 
2 The brink defined as 1) any extreme edge; verge; 2) a 
crucial or critical point, esp. of a situation or state beyond 
anticipation of the position and its liminality, in contrast to 
definitions based on relational position or normative status. 
Where Salen and Zimmerman have questioned what occurs 
when the boundary of the magic circle is blurred between 
the game and life [20], my question, and the question of 
forbidden or brink games, is exactly the opposite. It looks to 
when and where the recognition of this conflict is 
foregrounded. It looks specifically at games that embrace 
the contested space at the boundary of games and life—
pairing "it's just a game" with a knowing wink.  
These games need not be as exotic or socially contentious 
as the label "forbidden" implies. Take, for example, the 
game Twister (Hasbro). Anyone familiar with the game 
knows the rules of Twister are simple: one team spins a 
two-handed dial on a coloured wheel; players on the 
opposing team must match the configuration dictated by the 
dial on a large plastic mat covered with coloured circles 
using various parts of their body: right foot blue, left hand 
red. The team that wins has the last contorted player 
standing after all others have fallen. These are the explicit 
rules of the game. Of course, anyone who has played 
Twister understands this is not the whole story. The 
popularity of Twister lies in its forbidden play or brink 
status: the framing of the game allowing the temporary 
reinscribing of rules of intimate social distance. In real life, 
only intimate partners get this close. But in Twister, we are 
only playing the game. Wink.   
Consider the Syrian videogame The Stone Throwers (2000). 
Players take up the role of a young Palestinian standing in 
front of the contested Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, armed 
only with stones. The player must defend the mosque 
against advancing Israeli soldiers. Upon inevitably losing 
the game, the player is presented with an image of a dead 
Palestinian boy, and the message: "Well maybe you have 
killed some of the Israeli soldiers in the computer world, 
but this is the real world…Stop the killing of the innocents 
in Palestine before the game is really over" [20]. Perhaps 
not the most sophisticated message or play on boundaries to 
an external audience— but placing the game in context, 
                                                                                                 
which success or catastrophe occurs [3]. 
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 with an audience made primarily of middle eastern youth, 
the game stands in sharper relief to reality. Alternately, take 
a game such as Traffic Games' JFK Reloaded (2003), where 
you play out a game scenario with explicit and specific 
reference to actual historical figures—not real within the 
game, all too real outside of it. Could "non-fiction" games 
such as these be considered brink games? At what point is it 
more than “just a game?”  
APPROACH TO MIXED REALITIES 
Games involving forbidden play “raise fundamental 
questions about the artificiality of games and their 
relationship to real life proper” [20]. This suggests they 
have critical potential—that they have something to say 
back to games, or something to say to society. To take a 
closer look at this issue, I will turn to  functional systems 
theory, as read primarily through the work of Niklas 
Luhmann. Because of its primary focus on systems this 
study will be primarily descriptive, attempting to study 
functions (what these games do), not intentions, complex 
normative values or player agency. The goal of this 
approach will be to look at brink games within the broader 
subsystem of games, and to an extent within larger social 
systems. I will also attempt to contextualize this approach 
within a larger discourse surrounding the definition, 
boundaries and critical potential of games. Why this 
approach, in an area as value-charged as “forbidden 
games”? I am specifically interested in attempting a 
normatively-restricted approach to a research site that 
evokes strong value positions. These value positions may 
serve to obscure the functioning of brink games and 
forbidden play within larger systems.  
Luhmann based his theory of social systems on concepts 
from biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela
3. 
Luhmann describes social systems as autopoietic and 
operatively closed—reproducing and sustaining themselves 
from within without intervention from other systems. In 
contrast to most social theory, Luhmann sees the 
fundamental element of social systems as not individual 
agents or actions, but communications (emerging in the 
unity of information, context, and understanding). Systems 
and subsystems within them are seen to operate under a 
specific value logic, or binary code (e.g. the code for the 
legal system may be justice/injustice; the science system 
truth/nontruth). Society hangs together, as it were, by virtue 
of the structural coupling of its systems, and their mutual 
observance and/or agitation. Observation itself is a selection 
of what to observe and is constructed of a distinction (a 
marked state) and an indication (the selection of said 
marked state over its unmarked environment). As such, 
self-observation plays an important role in the continual 
boundary maintenance and differentiation for any system; a 
persistent definition of self and other (although every 
                                                          
3 With additional theory drawn  from Talcott Parsons and 
George Spencer Brown (among others). 
process within the system functions to sustain the whole). 
Self-observation is limited, however, in two key ways. First, 
an observer can only observe one side of a distinction at a 
time (one can't observe what one is simultaneously not 
observing). Luhmann addresses this issue through the 
concept of re-entry: allowing for a representation of the 
distinction to become part of the system (although only as a 
representation). Second, observations are limited by their 
confinement within a frame of reference. However, a higher 
level, second-order observation may occur through the 
observation of the frame and marked states of a first-order 
observation (although this second-order observation in turn 
has its own blind spot) [22]. Luhmann has related second-
order observation to deconstruction [16], and sees this 
meta-observation as a process of self-description in modern 
society. 
Bo Kampmann Walther (also drawing on the work of 
Luhmann) presents a case for a functionalist approach to 
game on the whole, noting the logico-formalistic 
configuration of games can be regarded as a differentiated 
subsystem operating as autopoietic with its own code and 
border. For Walther, “what is at stake here is a certain 
capacity for structuring domains of meaning through the 
interconnection of elements and through specific functional 
form-operations” [24]. A functionalist account of games 
presents a higher level view of the system operations 
emerging from individual play events. I would suggest a 
significant role (and place for critical engagement) for these 
works lies in their functional and structural properties 
within the larger process of differentiation between games 
and everyday life, in addition to the conditions of design, 
play and reception. 
FORBIDDEN GAMES (AND OTHERS ON THE BRINK)  
Salen and Zimmerman use the term “forbidden play” with 
particular reference to works that permit and/or encourage 
normally taboo behaviour. Games incorporating forbidden 
play, in essence, run rules from each “reality” in collision to 
each other, challenging the integrity of the boundary 
between worlds. Commonly, this means drawing out 
implicit social rules by putting them in conflict with 
implicit game rules.  Although the same structure could be 
produced through explicit rules 4 , there may be design 
considerations in keeping this variation rare—specifically 
the surprise and delight at realizing the rule conflict is a 
major appeal to the game, and players tend to be more 
aware of explicit rules (both internal and external to the 
game). This staging allows play with social rules at a 
reduced risk, removing much of the prohibition behind 
breaking the taboo [21]—it is after all, “just a game.”   
However, it is not enough just for the rule sets to collide—
as is shown through another Salen and Zimmerman 
                                                          
4
 And in fact games conflicting with explicit legal rules (i.e. 
illegal actions) is a somewhat popular suspense trope. 
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 example, Scrabble (Hasbro). They describe the example of 
permissible words in Scrabble including words taboo (and 
offensive) outside the space of the game, but permitted by 
the rules of Scrabble, given in Scrabble, word meaning is 
largely irrelevant [21]. Yet Scrabble is not considered an 
example of forbidden play, or brink game. It is not enough 
for rules to just conflict—this conflict needs to be an 
integral part of the game/play. It is a knowing (or self-
observing) conflict.  It is implicit that the words in Scrabble 
mean nothing—there is nothing mentioned in the game 
rules about word meaning (aside from the requirement that 
the word have meaning), and the meaning of words does 
not affect score. However, you could choose to play 
Scrabble as a brink game, by ignoring this implicit rule, and 
playing off the conflict between real world and in-game 
meaning: perhaps by sending strings of suggestive or 
offensive words to your opponent. Of course, you’re not 
really being provocative or rude… it’s “just a game.” In this 
way, discovering conflicting implicit social and game rules 
can allow “forbidden play” in games not specifically 
designed as brink games. 
Melanie Dawson presents interesting examples of forbidden 
or brink games in relation to the parlour culture of the late 
19th century. One example, “Genteel Lady” involves the 
repetition and extension of a ridiculously formal and 
complex phrase, that is continually appended with a list of 
“lavish" items. The successful player is the “Genteel Lady.”  
Although the game ostensibly mocks the formalities and 
extravegances of gentility, it also retains the goal of this 
status as the game's winning state. “Blind Mans Bluff” and 
other appropriated tactile children's games situated adult, 
sexualized preferences in an acceptable, permissible 
context; allowing for the expression of these desires against 
the backdrop of what could then be seen as malleable rules 
subject to reconfiguration and inflection. Such games were 
not only an opportunity to go against the social code, but 
also an affirmation that the participants' desires were not 
truly bound to such codes in the first place. Dawson further 
asserts these games not only tested players’ relation to 
cultural life, but provided a means for the measurement and 
recognition of abstract aptitudes, gave a sense of agency 
and control, required self-reflection, and allowed for the 
testing and rethinking of social conventions [7].  However, 
Dawson clearly demonstrates the ambivalence of this brink 
gameplay, finding “[e]ven as games encourage socially 
deviant acts, they simultaneously recognize a middling 
culture’s investment in genteel decorum, and in large 
measure, they build up on its importance as an ideal as well 
as a subject of debate" [7]. The "forbidden" act's status as 
subversive in turn reinforces and justifies the implicit rules 
being subverted, and the construct of the game often holds 
up the legitimacy of these very social structures.  
A more recent digital work, Jennifer Chowdhury and 
Mehmet Sinan Ascioglu's 2007 Intimate Controllers project, 
demonstrates the integration of peripherals with forbidden 
or brink play. The work consists of game controllers 
incorporated into undergarments so that gameplay 
necessitates physical interaction with these "intimate" zones. 
Such work illustrates the particular nature of a brink game 
in creating focal tension between in-game (basic arcade 
play) and extra-game realities. One of Chowdhury's stated 
design goals was to create video game play that would 
center around sensuous interaction with a play partner [5]. 
However, like the parlour game examples, the nature of the 
implicit/explicit rule conflict is not necessarily this 
straightforward.  Intimate Controllers not only reinscribes 
the controller as the body, but also the body as controller: in 
an attempt to make game play intimate by bringing in the 
reality of a sensual body peripheral, it in turn objectifies the 
real world intimate partner as a mere control device. 
Furthermore, in demarcating a space of subversion (the 
female breasts and male genitals of a heterosexual 
partnership) and manner of brink play, the work dictates an 
ideologically particular subjective perception of intimate 
space.  
Salen and Zimmerman emphasize the potential for this type 
of play to serve as a challenge to the rigid distinction 
between life and game realities,  “permitting hidden desires, 
nutty behavior, or even normally criminal actions” [21], and 
at the same time, protecting players from social sanction. 
Forbidden play in games creates distance in which 
(otherwise) unacceptable acts are contained and sanitized, 
allowing for the expression of impulses but at the same time 
safeguarding players by limiting this expression [21].  From 
Dawson's work, we can also see the potential for these 
brink games to end up legitimizing the very structures they 
critique; and from Chowdhury and Ascioglu's project, we 
can see the potential for such works to carry ideology in 
their demarcation of boundaries. I would argue, however, 
that the link between the reframing and ordering of social 
context and the sanitization of this behaviour should not be 
left unchallenged. For example, we may say that art, too, 
reframes reality, but in contrast we do not necessarily 
accept as a given art sanitizing desire.  
AN ACT APART 
Almost every contemporary definition of games makes 
some reference to the idea of games as “set apart” from 
reality5. There are several versions of this claim, ranging 
from the strict insistence on their separation, to an argument 
for the fundamental intertwining between all games and the 
                                                          
5
 This is not to say the issue of safety and separation, as 
exclusive properties of games, should be taken as a given. 
Some play is also quite dangerous (mountain climbing is a 
commonly cited example); consequential (impacting, for 
example, wealth, psychological health and/or social status); 
and non-play can also be approached with a lusory attitude 
(stock market) and/or seen as “set apart” from life or 
identity (as is sometimes the case with one’s work) 
[2,6,13,18]. Even Huizinga grants the sense of being in the 
game, as a bond, continues even after the game is over [12]. 
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 real world. I will recap these definitional elements only 
briefly, as the broader issues of game definition have been 
more than adequately explored in other works [13, 14, 21]. 
One of the earliest and most influential definitions of games 
comes from Roger Caillois. Caillois states play is 
necessarily separate and mindfully isolated from life. He 
stresses within this space apart, “nothing that takes place 
outside this ideal frontier is relevant…[once someone 
leaves the enclosure]. The game must be taken back within 
the agreed boundaries [in order to continue]” [4]. He further 
describes the game’s domain as restricted, closed, and 
protected (safe): a pure space, accompanied by a special 
awareness of a second reality or a free unreality, as opposed 
to real life [4]. Johan Huizinga reinforces this separation, 
although perhaps less militantly. It is from Huizinga’s 
quotation that we derive the now ubiquitous phrase “magic 
circle”:   
The arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the 
temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis court, the 
court of justice etc., are all in form and function 
play-grounds, i.e., forbidden spots
6 , isolated, 
hedged round, hallowed, within which special rules 
obtain. All are temporary worlds within the 
ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an 
act apart [12]. 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi describes the results of this 
configuration as allowing one to “distort reality” and 
practice behaviour as if experimentally, uncoupled from 
real world repercussions [6]. Even as he argues for games 
duality, Thomas Malaby acknowledges the “artifactual” 
nature of games and their status as culturally produced 
artifacts designed as separate from everyday life—even as 
they are inextricably tied to it. This is a key distinction, as it 
acknowleges the intentional construction of the game/life 
dichotomy as instrumental. Notes Malaby, “[w]e should be 
very interested, in each case, empirically, in how that 
boundary is maintained, how it is violated, and so on” [18]. 
However Malaby goes on to dispute the basic “setting 
apart” of games overall, suggesting games are not only 
grounded in human practice but resonate with other 
domains of experience—they are dual, both mimicking and 
constituting the everyday.  He argues the view that games 
are separate and safe constitutes an unwarranted 
exceptionalism that is not only not intrinsic nor universal to 
games, but participates in their marginalization.  For 
Malaby, viewing games as divorced from daily life 
constitutes an untenable separation that in the end 
undermines games as a significant social phenomenon [18].  
Others argue games oscillate between these two worlds, or 
constitute another mode or order of reality. Although 
                                                          
6
 Without getting lost in the spatial imagery, it is also 
important to consider conceptual and social forbidden spots 
within the context of this description. 
Lizabeth Klastrup draws upon Caillois’ definition in her 
work, she goes on to suggest the cultural fertility of games 
lies in their revelation of the character, pattern and values of 
society reiterated and negotiated through the game, adding: 
“The second-order reality nature of the game... makes 
possible a full-scale enactment of that which you might 
never dare if this was for “real” [14]. Jean Baudrillard 
describes games as a more radical simulacrum upon the 
simulacrum of reality (but one freely entertained and thus 
liberated from meaning and desire) [1]. From Alexander 
Galloway’s reading of Adorno, we find quite another 
position: the view that games do not stand apart from 
production, but rather form an “afterimage” of it, and 
contain symptoms of deeper social processes [9].   
Here too I would like to draw upon Luhmann’s work, not 
on games, but on similar issues relating to the position of 
art in relation to “reality.” Luhmann suggests a confusion of 
frames, such as between art and life, is always produced by 
an artwork, “the external frame reenters with work 
without—and this accounts for the appeal of the 
manoeuvre—being obstructed in its function of 
demarcating the work against the unmarked space of the 
world” [15]. He argues that the doubling of reality in art 
presents reality back to itself, allowing reality to be 
observed. Because we are dealing with similar issues 
relating to the projection of reality back onto itself 
(assuming games as a second order reality), this framework 
would appear to hold true for games as well. Luhmann does 
in fact note the doubling of reality in games, finding the 
reality of games distinguished (unproblematically) from 
everyday reality. This second reality creates an observer 
position for “real” life [17]. In other words, the “not real” 
game gives us a place from which to view everyday (non-
game) life, in contrast, as real.  
POISED ON THE BRINK 
Luhmann does not see games as set apart as much as 
constituting another order of reality:  
Games are episodes. They are not transitions to 
another way of living7. But that does not mean that 
real reality exists only before and after a game. 
Rather, everything that exists does so 
simultaneously. The game always contains, in each 
of its operations, references to the real reality 
which exists at the same time. With every move it 
marks itself as a game; and it can collapse at any 
moment if things suddenly get serious 8 . The 
continuation of the game requires that the 
boundaries be kept under constant surveillance. 
[17] 
                                                          
7
 A position echoed in the work of Victor Turner, who sees 
play, at least in modern culture, as liminoid (allowing 
respite) as opposed to liminal (transformative)[23]. 
8
 Here “serious” meaning simply external to the game. 
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 Walther too marks how the oscillation between play and 
non-play makes up the integrity of the game against an 
external reality. He argues that games thus emerge from 
negative preconditions whose reference makes game play 
possible [25]. In fact, this boundary maintenance is a 
function of the autopoiesis of the game subsystem, and may 
in of itself carry over into second-order observation—an 
observing of its observing. Walther describes the tension of 
autopoiesis as a self-awareness of ontological insecurity 
translating into the management of the non-game as other:   
It is a fundamental sign of the game itself that the 
threat of a ‘nongame’ domain or a ‘nongaming’ 
situation is forever intrinsically tied to the  
construction of the game itself, and the players 
have to be aware of and even stay  alert to this fact. 
Thus, a certain level of self-referentiality or, at the 
very least, a minimal awareness of the logical 
organization of play and nonplay is required. [25] 
Although Walther implicates all games in presupposing the 
tension of keeping within play, brink games make explicit 
this tension. While the imperative to maintain the game is 
key in any game, in forbidden or brink games it takes on an 
additional quality given the potential to breach the bounds 
of the game itself. Brink games not only force the 
awareness of explicit and implicit game rules, but of 
implicit and explicit non-game rules as well. The act of 
conscious maintenance of the game at the boundary 
necessitates a shared social knowledge of what it means to 
play a game, and what constitutes the conditions of that 
system. Where normally the continual production of the 
game boundary emerges from the autopoiesis of the system, 
a brink game may recast boundary production as a 
communication event, with the potential to carry meaning.  
Breach 
If play consists in providing formal, ideal, limited, 
and escapist satisfaction for these powerful drives, 
what happens when every convention is rejected? 
When the universe of play is no longer tightly 
closed? When it is contaminated by the real world 
in which every act has inescapable consequences? 
[4] 
As suggested by this (somewhat alarmist) Caillois passage, 
the idea of breaching the bounds of the magic circle is an 
essential part of the narrative of the brink game. Bogost 
argues that games, ideological and extrinsically subjective, 
both draw from and rupture into the world. He suggest a 
gap in the magic circle allowing both players and ideas to 
freely pass. This is later articulated as a breach in the 
boundary:  
[For] the magic circle to couple with the world, it 
must not be hermetic; it must have a breach 
through which the game world and the real world 
spill over into one another. The residue of this 
interaction infects both spheres, causing what I 
earlier called simulation fever, the nervous 
discomfort caused by the interaction of the game’s 
unit operational representations of a segment of the 
real world and the player’s subjective 
understanding of that representation.[2] 
For Erving Goffman, this breach of the boundary is 
alternately termed “flooding out” or breaking frame, and is 
a product of the tension between the external and the 
reinscribed reality in the game [10]. Goffman presents this 
in terms of the unwanted and unwelcome destruction of the 
game. However, rather than assigning this negative value to 
the breach, we can also look to the ways the threat of breach 
adds an important element of interest and surprise. So while 
Walther, too, notes the inherent danger of being “ ‘caught’ 
in reality,” he acknowledges a simultaneous fascination in 
this possibility. So while breach presents an “aggressive 
intermission” threatening to “terminate the privileges of 
play” and releasing its unfortunate victims back into the 
non-game [24], there is an inherent excitement found in 
teetering on the very edge of the game world.  
The kissing games put forward as examples by Salen and 
Zimmerman
9 can also help us examine the issue of breach. 
They note that kissing games provide the frame that 
sanctions otherwise weighty or disapproved social 
interaction, within a structure that nonetheless controls this 
interaction—“never going far enough to threaten social 
order” [21].  The point at which kissing in “Spin the Bottle” 
becomes “real kissing” (although of course it never is 
entirely unreal kissing, which is entirely the point) is the 
breach point of the game—the collapse into the non-game 
world. What makes the game exciting is the tangible threat 
of this breach; the heightened tension the game provides by 
taunting collapse. The ambiguity surrounding breach 
becomes the common business of its players, as they assess 
how real not-real needs to be to result in the collapse of the 
game into its other. Because of the prominent threat of 
breach, forbidden or brink games necessarily integrate this 
observation into the game in a way other games do not. 
THE CRITICAL POTENTIAL OF BRINKSMANSHIP  
By asking to what extent forbidden or brink games have 
critical potential, I mean to interrogate the ability of such 
games to launch an effective critique of games and/or 
society. From the perspective of functional systems theory, 
I have suggested games are products of autopoiesis within a 
larger social subsystem of games—a testing of the bounds 
of the magic circle as a function of continuing boundary 
maintenance.  In a closed system, simply as a function of 
differentiation between systems, forbidden or brink games 
are useful in that they reduce complexity and reinforce the 
stability of games overall. We can argue it is only the edges 
of the structure that define a centre (as Luhmann notes, the 
                                                          
9
 Originally drawn from Brian Sutton-Smith’s Kissing 
Games of Ohio [21]. 
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 form of a system being the difference of system and 
environment [16])— when games are defined it is 
commonly in reference to what they are not (i.e. games are 
not work, games are not make-believe, games are not 
stories); and as such, the most interesting and contentious 
examples thus exist on the edge of the magic circle (is 
Maxis' The Sims a game? Is Russian Roulette a game?). But 
this does not implicate forbidden or brink games in 
particular, only games on the border. What forbidden or 
brink games do specifically is draw attention to the border, 
and implicate it in their unfolding. In doing so, they 
destabilize immersion and force reflection on the construct 
of the game: the explicit and implicit rules and goals. This 
requires observation of both the game and non-game, 
marked and unmarked states. As such, a brink game forces 
second-order observation that includes the game frame. In 
ways, they are more game than the games set back from the 
boundary, as they additionally self-critique what it means to 
be a game. But perhaps more importantly, by pulling back 
the frame of observation, they also reveal the non-game 
social rules that are implicated in the game. 
For Luhmann, the function of games (if they can be 
assumed to operate, as leisure pursuits, under a binary value 
code of entertainment/non-entertainment within the mass 
media system), lies simply in destroying superfluous time 
[17]—perhaps not the most promising position for 
presenting a critique of society. I would propose there is 
some movement within the media system to suggest the 
possible differentiation between games and leisure in some 
contexts (for example, initiatives such as Games for Change, 
documentary/newsgames, and educational/training games). 
In these cases, games may operate under a code of 
information/non-information typical (well, at least 
traditional) to the news media. Luhmann has further 
suggested that mass media performs a second-order 
observing and describing of society [16], which may open a 
place for games in terms of this process. Working within 
operative closure, games cannot impact other systems (such 
as art or politics) directly, but this should not imply games 
cannot comment on and observe other systems—they 
commonly do. However, this model may suggest limits to 
their potential ability to agitate for change in these external 
systems, particularly if they are seen to operate under the 
code of entertainment rather than information. Brink games, 
however, in forcing second-order observation of the 
game/life boundary, may be situated in a more empowered 
position for social critique, since at the level of meta-
observation, their impact can extend beyond games and into 
society’s own self-description. 
For Csikszentmihalyi, “[w]hat play shows over and over 
again is the possibility of changing goals and therefore 
restructuring reality [6].” Games may be the vehicle for 
reversing the goals and rules of everyday life (along with, 
for example religion, art and sport), or forge a rigid, ordered 
worldview. He cautions:  
The problem with institutionalizing alternative 
realities in art or in games is that they become co-
opted by the system, subordinated to the prevailing 
world view. The paramount goals and rules 
maintain their status as the reality, playfulness is 
confined to the playground, from where it could 
never mount a serious challenge to real life. 
Emasculated, playfulness is allowed controlled 
expression through the safety valves of art and 
games. Thus playfulness has no chance to add its 
creative contribution to evolution; it becomes a 
homeostatic mechanism rather than an agent of 
change. [6] [emphasis added] 
It should be noted that this ambivalent assessment comes 
from the perspective of the player, rather than the system. 
As internally-situated observers of reality, it is fair to say 
brink games (as a subset of all games) risk co-option, or at 
very least dismissal. However, by virtue of second-order 
observation, brink games open up the possibility for 
creating fissures in the foundations and structures of non-
game realities implicated in the play by allowing for a 
higher level reflective stance that is not isolated within the 
game. 
FURTHER INQUIRY 
One difficulty with this methodological approach is that a 
system level view of brink games is, on the whole, divorced 
from insightful analysis of game players as subversive 
agents. This is not to say such an analysis isn’t essential. 
More work needs to be done exploring issues of agency and 
the impact of these games on social imagination. These 
investigations may also be able to draw on wider 
understandings of the uses and significance of breach (for 
example, in social constructs). What this approach has 
demonstrated is the importance of brink games in 
maintaining the structure of games as the articulation of the 
differentiation between games and everyday life, while 
simultaneously casting doubt back onto the nature of reality 
in the  “real” world. This includes the ability of brink games, 
perhaps like art, to critique culture and society as second-
order observers of socio-cultural systems. 
While this paper hasn’t specifically looked at Alternate 
Reality (ARG) or Pervasive Games, these areas might 
provide valuable insights into forbidden play and game 
design leveraging the game/reality brink. It would be 
interesting to look at brink games in relation to a work like 
42 Entertainment's Last Call Poker10 . However, that is not 
to say that ARGs are necessarily brink games. ARGs that 
create entirely self contained worlds would be different than 
games that explicitly reference the bounds of the game with 
a double coded “just a game” claim. By contrast, many 
ARGs in fact deny this claim: their mantra is “this is not a 
                                                          
10 Particularly the game’s use of poker-based “wakes” in 
real American cemeteries. 
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 game.” Obviously, there would be some movement between 
these two positions, and arguably one could play a closed 
ARG with particular attention to the reality breach within 
the game. In particular, Alison Harvey’s reference to the 
ethics of using non-player participants in ARGs [11] may 
be an important consideration for forbidden play in such 
games.  
Brink games offer an interesting design proposition for 
digital games; particularly games in which social relations 
between players are central. There is also an opportunity in 
this design space to use the idea of the brink as the core for 
social issue and activist games, rather than focusing 
exclusively on content. Games projects such as Intimate 
Controllers, non-fiction and activist works such as The 
Stone Throwers and JFK Reloaded, and ARG strategies 
such as found in Last Call Poker, are ideally a start in 
drawing critical focus to the relationship between modes of 
reality. Such works are “just games” in a way clearly 
highlighting they are not just games—a useful insight in the 
link between games and everyday life. 
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